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Abstract 
For the purpose of recovering a paid amount within the insured sum, however, in addition to 
the owed amount, the insurer sues his client for claims. Does the insurer have, to this end, a cleared 
way towards unjust enrichment? 
The provisions of the 1864 Civil Code do not contain definitions of ex contractu and actio de 
in rem verso. 
The doctrine has established the acceptability requirements of actio de in rem verso, however, 
it did not do the same for ex contractu, and there is no notable change to this matter after the Civil 
Code became effective. 
This situation is also maintained in the current Law No.287/2009 on the Civil Code. 
Hence, the separation of the configuration and enforcement area of the two types of actions 
continues to be done in terms of jurisprudence by strictly relating to the case at hand. 
The study starts from an actual case the settling of which highlights the issue of determining 
the subsidiary nature, hence the acceptability of the unjust enrichment. The purpose of this study is to 
re/focus on an old dichotomy, i.e. the contract-based action (ex contractu) and the action based on an 
licit deed, that of unjust enrichment (actio de in rem verso). 
The primary goal of the study consists of highlighting the aspects that the provisions of the 
1864 Civil Code and those of the new Civil Code have in common or not in terms of the two types of 
actions before the court, the doctrine-related solutions given as concerns the characteristics and legal 
status of the two actions and the fact that, in the nex Civil Code as well, the separation line between 
the two actions is determined on the basis of jurisprudence, being left at the judges' discretion and 
wisdom, with all related consequences thereof. 
Keywords: Insurance contract: amount paid without being owed: indemnity action 
before the court: actio de in rem verso: ex contractu action 
Introduction 
This  article  is  not  writing  practice.  It  is  derived  from  a  particular  case,  i.e.  the 
insurance contract, and initially it was believed that the issue stayed within the specific matter 
of this type of contract. 
A more in-depth analysis reveals however the general character of the matter as the 
conflict between the ex contractu action and actio de in rem verso may appear each time 
when, in almost any type of contract, either party’s performance exceeds the sphere of its 
contractual obligation and raises the issue of the type of action to be resorted to in order to 
recover the incurred prejudice. 
For instance, such an issue may appear in contractor agreements, service contracts, 
sale-purchase contracts, in brief, in any contracts; the likelihood that such a restitution claim 
will be subject to the judgment of a court of law is very high. 
In the 1864 Civil Code, neither of the two actions has a legal definition. 
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The unjust enrichment and action suitable for such illicit legal deed (actio de in rem 
verso or the restitution action respectively) were extensively dealt with in the specialized 
literature and consecrated in terms of jurisprudence. 
Similarly,  however  without  having  a  detailed  treatment  comparable  to  that  of  the 
above-mentioned concept, the ex contractu action (also known as contract-based action or 
contractual  liability  action)  is  constantly  invoked  in  doctrine  and  jurisprudence,  being 
attached  to  the  issue  concerning  the  contractual  third-party  liability  and  enforcement  of 
judgment concerning contractual obligations. 
Law No. 287/2009 on the Civil Code, republished and updated, includes four articles – 
art. 1345-1348 – on unjust enrichment and the restitution action which it generates, however, 
does not deal with the contract-based action. 
Given that the provisions of art. 1348 of Law No. 287/2009 consecrate in terminis the 
subsidiary  nature  of  the  restitution  action  as  compared  to  any  “other  action”  which  the 
creditor is entitled to, it is obvious that the ex contractu action, the most common type of 
action meant to cover contractual prejudice, should find a configuration both at a legislative, 
and doctrine level, as this procedural means can be a true exception of unacceptability in the 
case of actio de in rem verso.  
The subject matter of this study 
The de facto situation  
The  litigation  consisted  of  the  following  de  facto  situation,  which  was  given  a 
definitive decision not objected to by the litigating parties: 
S.C. A.R.A. S.A., in its capacity of insurer, and S.C. G.S. S.A., in its capacity of 
insured, entered into an insurance contract for a self-propelled barge. The insurance covered 
the risk of total loss, special and general average, third party collision liability and rescue 
expenses, up to the limit of Euro 205,000. The barge, loaded with plate rolls, got shipwrecked 
during a trip along the Danube River. It was established that major repairs were required, 
which repairs were done in a shipyard in Austria and shipyard in Romania.  
Given that the insured event affected both the ship, and the merchandise on board the 
ship, this was considered a case of general average and it was decided to document the case. 
A specialized company
1 was supposed to draft the average adjustment document
2. Until this 
document was drafted, at the insured’s request, the insurer made payments to the insurance 
policy-related account either directly to the insured or to certain of his creditors. The amounts 
paid were Euro 91,701 Euro and Romanian Lei 132,927.  
The general average adjustment document that was not objected to by either party 
after it was drafted determined that the Euro 68,562 owed amount was made up of Euro 
54,781.12 – merchandise share and Euro 13,780.88 Euro – ship share. 
In  this  context,  the  insurer  estimated  that  it  owed  the  insured  only  the  amount 
determined by the average adjuster as being the ship share. For the already paid difference it 
submitted an action before a court of law for the restitution of the amount of Euro 52,257.57 
that was allegedly paid without being owed, which action was indicated at one of the hearing 
as being based on unjust enrichment. 
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2 Average adjustment – document drafted by the average adjuster according to the statutory legal standards and customs of 
the unloading ports for the liquidation of the general average – www.crispedia.ro  208    Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Private Law 
 
The decisions of the courts of law 
In a first trial cycle, the action was rejected as expired. The decision was cancelled by 
the first judiciary control court by a decision maintained by the appeal court. 
When  re-judged,  the  court  of  first  instance  rejected  the  action  as  unacceptable, 
estimating that the claimant had the contract-based action, not the unjust enrichment-based 
restitution  action,  at  his  disposal.  The  decision  was  not  upheld  by  the  appeal  court  that, 
accepting the appeal submitted by the insurer, completely changed the decision made by the 
court  of  first  instance,  i.e.  rejected  the  unacceptability  exception,  accepted  the  action 
submitted by the claimant and obliged the respondent to pay the amount of Euro 52,257.57 
standing for indemnities. 
The second appeal court accepted as a majority the appeal submitted by the insured, 
changed the decision made by appeal court, i.e. rejected the appeal submitted by the insurer 
against the first court decision that this second appeal court maintained. The judge expressing 
a separate opinion estimated that the second appeal should be rejected as ungrounded. 
The conflicting issue concerned the acceptability of the restitution action in that the 
subsidiary nature of this action should be taken into account in relation to the contract-based 
action. 
In brief, the following arguments were brought:  
Majority opinion 
The second appeal court noted as a majority that the court of first instance and the 
appeal  court  correctly  accepted  that  the  unjust  enrichment  was  a  legal  deed  by  which  a 
person’s assets are increased based on another person’s assets, with no legal basis for it and 
that this legal deed resulted in the restitution obligation of the person whose assets were thus 
increased. 
The court notes that one of the legal conditions for submitting the restitution action is 
the absence of any other legal means of recovery. Doctrine and jurisprudence outline the 
subsidiary nature of this sanction in this respect. 
The second appeal court notes as a majority that this case does not leave room for an 
actio de in rem verso, given the existence of the contractual insurance relations between the 
parties based on which the payments were made, which makes the increase of the insured’s 
assets take place on a legal basis. 
The  court  also  notes  that  the  insurer’s  allegation  that  only  a  request  for  the 
enforcement  of  a  contractual  duty  or  liability  for  non-performance  or  inappropriate 
performance would make the unjust enrichment become unacceptable. 
In this respect, the second appeal court accepted that no legal provision adds to the ex 
contractu actions only those invoked by the insurer and that an action by which a contracting 
party requests the other party a restitution of payments made under the contract and later 
considered not owed is equally contractual. 
To support the same opinion, the second appeal court notes that an ex contractu action 
is not exclusively a positive one, by which contract enforcement is requested, but is any 
contract-related action, and that a delineation between owed and not owed payments is done 
following an examination of contract-derived rights and obligations as well. 
It is also highlighted that a distinction must be made between unjust enrichment, as a 
legal deed, that may, in the previously mentioned conditions, result in the right to initiate an 
actio  de  in  rem  verso  and  unjust  enrichment  as  an  effect  of  the  failure  to  perform  or 
appropriately perform any contract, that however does not clear the way in itself to initiating 
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Separate opinion 
It is noted that the judge expressing a separate opinion differentiates himself/herself 
from the majority opinion only in terms of the acceptability of the restitution action, and 
supports  his/her  decision  with  arguments  leading  to  the  conclusion  that,  in  this  case,  the 
insurer  did  not  have  the  ex  contractu  action  at  hand,  hence  the  legal  condition  of  the 
subsidiary  nature  of  the  restitution  action  was  fulfilled,  which  action  is  thus  considered 
acceptable. 
In this respect, the judge expressing a separate opinion notes that in the 1864 Civil 
Code there are no legal definitions for actio de in rem verso and the ex contractu action, that 
doctrine and jurisprudence closely dealt with unjust enrichment and identified the material 
and legal conditions for the initiation of the restitution action based on this illicit legal deed, 
constantly indicating the subsidiary nature of this type of action that implies the lack of any 
other legal means to cover the incurred loss. He/she also notes that in the case of ex contractu  
he/she cannot state the same, as no definition was given by doctrine and jurisprudence. 
However, the judge expressing a separate opinion notes that the legal means to recover 
the prejudice generated by the contractual tort may be configured starting from two legal 
texts:  art.  1021  and  art.  1073  of  the  1864 Civil  Code,  which  apply  to  the  relevant  case, 
bringing forth the following arguments: 
The provisions of art. 1021 of the 1864 Civil Code gives the party that the contractual 
commitment has not been fulfilled for the right to choose between the action of enforcing the 
contract  when  this  is  possible  and  the  action  of  terminating  the  contract  and  be  paid 
indemnities. 
The provisions of art. 1073 of the same Code gives the same contracting party the 
right to be granted the precise fulfillment of the obligation and, if not, the right to receive 
indemnities. 
The two legal texts result it the conclusion that, whenever the creditor of an unfulfilled 
obligation chooses the action to enforce the contract (assumption I of art. 1021 of the Civil 
Code), he is entitled to the in-kind enforcement of this contract (“the precise fulfillment of the 
obligation” - assumption I of art. 1073 of the Civil Code); otherwise, he is entitled to request 
an equivalent enforcement (“right to compensation” - assumption II of art.1073 Civil Code). 
The core meaning of both legal texts is that they give the right to a contract-based 
action that only the unfulfilled obligation creditor benefits from and that the object of this 
action is only the other party’s failure to perform which may be obliged to do in kind or by 
equivalent. 
In brief, these are the  characteristics  and conditions  where the judge expressing a 
separate opinion notes that the contract-based action may be resorted to. 
As concerns the aforementioned case, he/she notes that the only pecuniary obligation 
laid down in the parties’ contract resting on the respondent, which enforcement or indemnities 
may be ask for, is the one concerning the payment of the insurance premium and that the 
parties did not include in their contract a clause under which, if the insurer paid within the 
insured  amount  limits,  but  not  more  than  he  owed  for  the  actually  materialized  risk,  the 
insurer undertakes to return this amount where only this clause may be a justification for an 
action for contract-based claims under the provisions of art. 969 of the Civil Code. 
 In this context, the judge expressing a separate opinion notes that the only action that 
the insurer may use to be able to recover the amount paid in excess of the prejudice actually 
incurred by the insured, even within the maximum limit of the insured amount, is the unjust 
enrichment action, which action was the first he submitted ab initio before the court of law. 
Thus, the judge expressing a separate opinion deems unacceptable the thesis according 
to which the unjust enrichment action is excluded whenever the parties have a contractual 
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performed and goes beyond the contract with no convention (even tacit) and leads to the 
increase in the assets of either party, in correlation with a reduction in the assets of the other 
party, cannot fall under the contract except in the cases expressly and limitatively laid down 
in art. 970 para. 2 of the 1864 Civil Code. 
With reference to the same aspect, the judge expressing a separate opinion believes 
that the circumstance that, in order to determine the sum claim before the court, the court 
should  examine  the  contractual  clauses  as  this  is  exclusively  intended  to  establish  a 
delineation between “something owed” under the contract and “not owed” and determine 
where the insured risk-related indemnity payment obligations end for the insurer and where 
unjust enrichment (i.e. outside the contract) starts for the insured, which unjust enrichment 
leaves room for the actio de in rem verso. A relevant fact is that, according to doctrine and 
jurisprudence, what is owed under a convention or legal provision is based on a just cause, 
and what lacks such basis comes from the licit or illicit deed. 
The judge expressing a separate opinion also notes that the lack of a legal regulation or 
doctrine examination of the legal status of the ex contractu action makes the extended use of 
this procedural means, seen as a possibility to reaching an agreement by the parties for all 
contract-related claims, seem justified as these claims are attached to a unique relation of 
facts. 
However,  he/she  thinks  this  temptation  should  be  limited  whenever  this  generous 
approach harms the person who, precisely differentiating what was owed from what exceeds 
the contract, understands to rely on the illicit unjust enrichment, resorting to actio de in rem 
verso upon compliance with all material and legal conditions that are consecrated in doctrine 
and jurisprudence. 
Hence, the judge expressing a separate opinion chooses the limited and restrictive 
interpretation of the ex contractu action, deriving from the aforementioned joint interpretation 
of  the  provisions  of  art.  1021  and  art.  1073.  A  more  extensive  interpretation  of  the  ex 
contractu action would lead to the rejection of the actio de in rem verso as unacceptable and 
would inappropriately set up, only based on the interpretation of art.969 – 970 of the 1864 
Civil Code, an exception of unacceptability that, as a rule, derives and should derive from a 
legal norm exclusively and beyond any doubt. 
All  the  above  considerations  have  been  the  basis  of  the  separate  opinion  judge’s 
conviction that, in this case, the claimant, i.e. the insurer, could not rely on the ex contractu 
action, but only on unjust enrichment. The objection submitted by the claimant, i.e. insured, in 
this respect was considered ungrounded, being, hence, rejected. 
Importance and current interest raised by the issue 
As shown in the introduction of this study, the ex contractu and actio de in rem verso 
actions were not legally regulated by the 1986 Civil Code, which aspect is noted in both the 
majority opinion, and the separate opinion expressed in the decision of the ultimate court
3. 
As concerns unjust enrichment and the restitution action w hich it entitles to, the 
Romanian and foreign specialized literature is abundant and constant, the two legal concepts 
being consecrated in jurisprudence as well
4. 
                                                 
3 Decision No. 3672 as of October 31, 2013 of the High Court of Cassation and Justice – II Civil Division. 
4 The following works are worth mentioning: 
-Constantin Stătescu and Corneliu Bîrsan, Drept civil. Teoria generală a obligaţiilor, Bucharest, All Publishing House, 1993, 
107-111; 
-Stătescu and Bîrsan, Drept civil, Bucharest, Hamangiu Publishing House, 2008, 117-123, where they quote the Commercial 
Decision No. 320/2005 of the Bucharest Court of Appeal – V Commercial Division and Civil Decision No. 3548/1999 of the 
Court of Appeal Bucharest – III Civil Division; 
-Ion Dogaru  “Some considerations regarding the place, the role and the mechanism of injust enrichement in the sections of 
civil obligations” in Ion Dogaru, Texte juridice, Bucharest, Universul juridic Publishing House, 2011, 160-166; 
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Contrarily, the ex contractu action is seldom mentioned in the specialized literature, in 
certain cases, being opposed to or, on the contrary, dealt with in conjunction with another type 
of action, with no precise description of its legal status, as was the case of actio de in rem 
verso. 
Also, in a significant number of decisions, the courts of law refer to the contract-based 
action, particularly in commercial matters, given that the legal relations between traders are 
predominantly contractual in nature. 
Our present analysis started from a legal relation governed by the 1864 Civil Code. 
The issue it raises is not, however, outdated, given that Law No. 287/2009 on the Civil Code, 
as updated, does not fundamentally change the particularities of the matter. 
Similarly to the 1864 Civil Code, the new Civil Code includes no reference to the ex 
contractu action. 
The specialized literature dealing with the provisions of the new Civil Code
5, though 
quite abundant, brings no novelty whatsoever in this respect. It is worth noting that one single 
paper mentions the  ex contractu solution for the automatic serving of notice to the debtor, 
highlighting that this is done when the parties agree that “merely having reached the agreed 
deadline for contract performance equals serving a notice”
6. It is obvious that the above-
mentioned quote has no relation to the action before a court known as ex contractu action. 
As far as unjust enrichment and the action driving from it are concerned, the makers of 
the new 2009 Civil Code focused on filling a legislative gap corrected in the former Civil 
Code by doctrine and jurisprudence. 
These two concepts are dealt with in four articles: 
Art. 1345 states as follows: “The person who got rich to the detriment of another 
person, but cannot be imputed this, shall restitute to the extent of the asset loss incurred by the 
other party, but with no liability beyond said enrichment.” 
Art.  1346  bring  a  most  welcome  novel  element,  i.e.  presents  the  cases  were 
enrichment should be considered justified. 
Art. 1347 stipulates the conditions and extent of restitution, and its provisions are 
added those of art. 1639-1647 of the Code on restitution of performance. 
Finally,  art.  1348  concerns  in  terminis  the  secondary  nature  of  the  request  for 
restitution and maintains the phrasing though it was a subject of objections and dispute in the 
specialized  literature  dealing  with  the  former  Civil  Code,  stipulating  the  following:  “The 
request for restitution cannot be accepted if the harmed party is entitled to another action in 
order to get what is owed to him.” 
Actio de in  rem verso  and unjust  enrichment  are also discussed in  the specialized 
literature related to the new Civil Code. Professor Paul Vasilescu’s previously quoted paper 
may serve as an example
7. 
The analysis of the two types of actions, at a legislative level – on the one hand, and at 
doctrine and jurisprudence level – on the other hand, makes us note the fact that the current 
                                                                                                                                                         
-Dimitrie Gherasim, Îmbogăţirea fără cauză în dauna altuia, Bucharest, the Romanian Academy Publishing House, 1993; 
-Muriel Fabre-Magnan, droit des obligations. Vol.2. Responsabilit￩ civile et quasi-contrats, II-i￨me edition mise ￠ jour, Paris, 
Presses Universitaires de France, 2010, 446-452; 
-Philippe Malaurie, Laurent Ayn￨s and Philippe Stoffel-Munck, Les Obligations, V-i￨me edition, Paris, Defr￩nois, Lextenso 
editions, 2011, 575-584. 
5 Of which we mention, exempli gratia, the following works: 
-Gabriel Boroi and Liviu Stănciulescu, Instituţii de drept civil, Bucharest, Hamangiu Publishing House, 2012; 
-Liviu Pop, Ionuţ-Florin Popa and Selian Ioan Vidu, Tratat elementar de drept civil. Obligaţiile, Bucharest,  Universul Juridic 
Publishing House, 2012; 
-Ioan Adam, Drept civil. Obligaţiile . Contractul, Bucharest, C.H.Beck Publishing House, 2011 
-Liviu Stănciulescu and Vasile Nemeş, Dreptul contractelor civile şi comerciale, Bucharest, Hamangiu Publishing House, 
2013. 
6 Paul Vasilescu, Drept civil. Obligaţii, Bucharest, Hamangiu Publishing House, 2012, 86. 
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legal regulation of the contract-based obligations and those based on the licit legal fact of 
unjust  enrichment  shows  no  content-related  differences  from  the  previous  one,  as  the 
conditions for the activation of the contractual third-party liability are the same just as the 
material and legal conditions to start an actio de in rem verso are the same. 
In  this  context,  it  is  of  significance  that  the  law-maker  unequivocally  states  the 
secondary nature of the actio de in rem verso and completely ignores the ex contractu, not 
giving any clue whatsoever on who, to what purpose and in what conditions can initiate it. 
The issue that is unquestionably and firmly raised in this context is related not to legal 
status of actio de in rem verso, as in this case there is now a legal provision, sustained by 
older and newer doctrine, which is constant, and previous unitary jurisprudence in line with 
the doctrine principles. 
In reality, the issue is raised in relation to the ex contractu action, a concept that seems 
to  be  obvious,  but  legal  status  of  which  is  the  object  of  debate  and  dispute,  the  most 
compelling proof being the decision made by the ultimate court with the separate opinion that 
we previously referred to. 
In the context of the current regulations, it can be estimated that, just as in the case of 
the 1864 Civil Code, a configuration of the ex contractu action can be outlined starting from 
the legal provisions that keep, de lege lata, the essence of the provisions of art. 969,  970, 
1020-1021 and 1073 of the 1864 Civil Code. 
Thus,  art.  1270  para.  1  of  Law  No.  287/2009  on  the  Civil  Code  stipulates:  “The 
contract that is validly entered into has the power of law between the contractual parties”; this 
article is the equivalent of art. 969 of the 1864 Civil Code and consecrates the pacta sunt 
servanda legal principles. 
Art.  1272  of  Law  No.  287/2009  on  the  Civil  Code  takes  over  and  adds  to  the 
provisions of art. 970 of the former Code and stipulates: 
- para.1: “The contract that is validly entered into obliges not only to the fulfillment of 
what is expressly stipulated, but to all the consequences that the practices set between parties, 
common practices, law or equity attach to the contract depending on its nature.”; 
-  para.2:  “Common  contractual  clauses  go  without  saying,  though  not  expressly 
stipulated.” 
As  a  novelty  to  the  former  Civil  Code,  the  provisions  of  art.  1350  of  Law  No. 
287/2009 on the Civil Code concern contractual liability, stating that any person shall fulfill 
his/her contractual obligations and that, if failing to do so with no reason, he/she shall be 
responsible for the remedy of the harm done to the other party, being obliged to remedy said 
prejudice under the law. 
Another aspect of novelty consists of the provisions of art.1170 of Law No. 287/2009 
of  the  Civil  Code  stipulate  the  parties’  obligations  to  act  in  good  faith  all  along  the 
performance of the contract. 
Similarly to the provisions of art. 1073 of the 1864 Civil Code, but providing more 
details, the provisions of art. 1516 para.1 of the new Civil Code stipulate the creditor’s right 
to acquire the full, precise and timely fulfillment of the obligations; the provisions of art. 1516 
para. 2 point 1 stipulate, in the case of unjustified failure to perform, the creditor’s right to 
request or initiate the attachment of the obligation; the provisions of art. 1527-1529 stipulate 
the in-kind attachment; and the provisions of art. 1530-1548 of the same law stipulate the 
equivalent attachment. 
As  a  novelty  compared  to  the  provisions  of  art.  1021  of  the  1864  Civil  Code 
concerning the right of the creditor of the unfulfilled obligation to request the “cancellation” 
of the contract, the provisions of art. 1516 para. 2 point 2 of the new Civil Code concern the 
possibility given to the same creditor to request the rescission or termination of the contract, 
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the same article give the same party the right to use, when necessary, any other means under 
the law in order to enjoy his right. 
Having examined these legal texts that govern the issue of contractual obligations, we 
can draw the conclusion that the basis of the ex contractu action is, to a great extent, that in 
the former civil law. An examination of the provisions of art. 1516 of the new Civil Code 
leads  to  the  conclusion  that,  whenever  a  contractual  obligation  is  not  performed  or  is 
performed in a delayed or inappropriate manner, the debtor of the relevant obligation may be 
held responsible under third party contractual liability. 
If, under art. 1516 para. 2 point 1 thesis II of the new Civil Code, the creditor does not 
resort to the attachment of said obligation, he may choose among the remedies laid down in 
art. 1516 para. 2 pint 1-3 of the same Code by way of a contract-based action before a court of 
law. 
Hence, one may conclude that, in the system set up by Law No. 287/2009, the initiator 
of the ex contractu action is the creditor of the unfulfilled obligation, which seems to leave 
out the party having performed the agreed obligation from such action and is targeted against 
the other party for the restitution of the additional performance. 
These arguments result in the conclusion that a debate on the proposed topic, even if 
starting from a legal relation governed by the former civil law, continues to be an up-to-date 
matter, given the solutions proposed by the law maker, de lege lata, as far as the contractual 
civil liability is concerned. 
The  debate  still  has  great  significance,  given  the  absence  of  a  legal,  doctrine  or 
jurisprudential  definition  of  the  ex  contractu  action  and  that  the  case  subject  to  analysis 
revealed the fact that courts of law may, in theory, select an wider interpretation (such as that 
of  the  majority  opinion  in  the  decision  commented  on)  or,  on  the  contrary,  a  restrictive 
interpretation (such as that of the separate opinion in the same decision), with significant 
consequences on the decision concerning the restitution action. 
Mention  must  be  made  that,  as  shown  in  the  separate  opinion,  following  a  more 
general interpretation of the ex contractu action, based on a logical and legal rationale, not on 
one or several legal texts, an exception of unacceptability may be set up against the restitution 
action, limiting the party’s  access  to  a legal  means  laid down by law  and via which the 
damage incurred may be covered. 
It is also a significant fact that the option of giving a more general interpretation of the 
ex contractu action also had consequences in terms of the expiry of the right to bring a legal 
action before the court. 
Thus, in the case of contractual obligations, the provisions of art. 2524 para. 1 of Law 
No.  287/2009  stipulate  the  rule  of  the  expiry  deadline  lapsing  from  the  date  when  the 
obligation becomes outstanding. An obligation to restitute such as the one that generated the 
above-mentioned dispute cannot be considered as having a due date agreed by the parties or 
defined by law; hence, it appears to be governed by art. 2523 of the same law, stipulating that 
the expiry occurs as of the date when the party entitled to that right became aware of or, on a 
case-by-case basis, should have become aware of the existence of such right. 
As to  the action in  the area of insurance, the  provisions  of art. 2527 in  Law No. 
287/2009 on the Civil Code stipulate that the expiry starts lapsing as of the expiry of the dates 
laid down by law or established by the parties for the payment of the insurance premium, 
indemnity payment respectively or, as the case may be, the indemnities owed by the insurer. 
An analysis of these legal provisions results in the conclusion that, in the case of an 
insurance contract, the ex contractu action could be initiated either by the insured – for the 
payment of the insurance premium or indemnities, as the case may be, in which case the 
expiry starts lapsing on the legally defined date or the date conventionally established for the 
payment of these sums, or the insurer – for the payment of the insurance premium, in which 214    Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Private Law 
 
case the expiry starts lapsing on the legally or conventionally established date for the payment 
of this premium. 
Therefore, an examination of the provisions of art. 2527 of Law No. 287/2009 on the 
Civil Code leads to the conclusion based on the per a contrario argument that the only ex 
contractu action the insurer has against the insured is that concerning the payment of the 
insurance premium, not the action to restitute an indemnity or indemnity paid in excess. 
If we were to start from the arguments suggested by the majority opinion, we would 
note that in this case it is impossible to determine the exact moment when the expiry deadline 
started in relation to the special law - art.2527 and when the enforcement of the general rule in 
art.  2523  should  be  done,  which  is  utterly  against  the  specialia  generalibus  derogant 
principle. 
Conclusions 
Divergent  judicial  practice  and  lack  of  doctrine-based  study  on  the  matter  of  the 
relation  between  the  contract-based  action  and  the  restitution  action,  with  unfavourable 
consequences  on  the  latter,  set  in  the  context  of  a  legislative  framework  that  is  almost 
identical to that set by the 1864 Civil Code make this debate topic be a significant topic of the 
moment after Law No. 287/2009 on the Civil Code became effective. 
This  study  considers  the  law  maker’s  intervention  as  being  the  ideal  solution  that 
should result in a legal definition of the ex contractu action or in setting the legal status of this 
action, at least the way it approached the restitution action based on unjust enrichment. 
This  primary  goal  of  our  study  may  seem  absurd  and  far  exaggerated,  but  it  is 
completely justified and real, given, on the one hand, the aforementioned arguments, that may 
potentially generate divergent judicial practice, hence, far from being unitary. 
On the other hand, a legislative intervention is not impossible given the fact that, in the 
new Civil Code, the law maker frequently dealt with other action types as well. Mention must 
be  made  of  the  following  merely  as  a  matter  of  example:  filiation  action,  action  of 
determination of paternity outside the marriage, action for the recovery of possession, action 
of denial of superficies, co-ownership action, actions of acceptance of superficies, usufruct or 
easement, action for real estate registration etc. 
The purpose of this study is not however that of determining a legislative intervention 
on the legal status of ex contractu action, but –mainly – that of starting a debate on the topic, a 
debate by specialists and legal professionals and that, by legal arguments, may outline the 
profile of this legal concept that, at first sight, seems quite simple, but, if looked at more 
carefully, is open to plenty of approaches with most surprising consequences. 
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